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Abstract  
This paper looks at the European Union as a laboratory to study how ‘spatially-targeted’ policies (i.e. 
the EU Cohesion and Rural Development Policies) interact with sectoral ‘spatially-blind’ policies (i.e. 
the Common Agricultural Policy - CAP), jointly shaping regional growth dynamics. The analysis of the 
drivers of regional growth shows that the EU Regional Policy has a positive influence on economic 
growth in all regions. However, its impact is stronger in the most socio-economically advanced areas 
and is maximised when its expenditure is complemented by Rural Development and CAP funds. The 
top-down funding of the CAP seems to be able to concentrate some benefits in the most deprived 
areas of the Union.  This suggests that bottom-up policies are not always the best approach to 
territorial cohesion. Top-down policies may – in some cases – be effective in order to channel 
resources to the most socio-economically deprived areas. Territorial cohesion requires the flexible 
integration and coordination of both bottom-up and top-down approaches. 
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1. Introduction   
 
At the peak of the Economic Crisis the European Commission launched a sophisticated and multi-
dimensional strategy to boost growth and jobs in the European Union (EU) over the next decade: the 
Europe 2020 (EU2020) strategy (European Commission, 2010). EU2020 targets a large set of drivers 
of economic growth and employment in a co-ordinated and systemic fashion promoting, at the same 
time, gradual reforms in existing EU policies. In this context, EU2020 identifies the EU Cohesion 
Policy as a key delivery tool for its objectives. The EU Cohesion Policy is not simply aimed at inter-
regional income redistribution; its key objective is to support long-term sustainable development in 
all EU regions including the most deprived areas. While giving Cohesion Policy a central role in 
shaping the economic future of the Union, EU2020 has also assigned all other EU policies (including 
Agricultural and Rural Development Policies) the objective to contribute to the achievement of the 
developmental goals of the strategy. In other words, all EU policies (including sectoral policies) have 
been asked to contribute to economic growth and development in all areas of the EU in a 
coordinated fashion.  
 
This fundamental shift in the objectives of all EU policies and the unprecedented emphasis on their 
coordination to serve a common set of overarching objectives pose a number of key conceptual and 
empirical questions. What is the impact of fundamentally different policies on the economic 
performance of the highly heterogeneous EU regions? What is the optimal combination between the 
traditional top-down approach of sectoral policies and the bottom-up nature of regional and rural 
development policies? What are the benefits arising from better policy coordination? 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of these questions for the economic growth prospects of the EU 
regions over the next decade, very limited attention has been paid so far to the interaction between 
the EU Cohesion Policy and other EU policies. The EU Cohesion Policy is a ‘spatially targeted’ policy: 
eligibility and funding are granted on the basis of geographical criteria and its outcomes are also 
assessed in terms of the performance of well-defined spatial units (administrative regions). The EU 
Rural Development Policy (RDP) is also  ‘spatially targeted’ although its targets are defined in terms 
of a combination of geographical, sectoral and socio-economic attributes that define ‘rural areas’. 
Finally, there are also other policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), that albeit 
neutral in their intent, exhibit considerable spatial impacts.  As a consequence the EU Cohesion 
Policy does not operate in a vacuum but it interacts at the territorial level with other EU policies that 
– intentionally or unintentionally - might magnify or curb its influence on regional economic 
performance. In this sense, the ‘New Regional Policy’ paradigm (OECD, 2009b) advocates that all 
European policies, irrespective of whether they are ‘spatially targeted’ or ‘spatially blind’ (Duhr et al, 
2010) should support territorial cohesion and promote growth in regions with “different social, 
institutional, and technological features” (Barca, McCann and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012, p. 143).   
 
This paper, therefore, makes a twofold contribution:  
 
First, it cross-fertilises different streams of literature by developing a conceptual framework for the 
joint analysis of the impacts of sectoral and territorial policies. It makes use of the European Union 
as a laboratory to study how sectoral/’spatially blind’ policies interact on the ground with ‘spatially 
targeted’ policies, jointly shaping regional growth dynamics. This approach to policy-induced growth 
dynamics has significant implications for public policies not only in the European Union: relevant 
lessons can be learned for the USA (where Agricultural Policies still absorb relevant shares of public 
funds – see Alston et al., 2007; OECD, 2015) as well as for emerging countries (such as China and 
India) where agricultural and rural development policies are often the main source of funding for 
territorial development actions (OECD, 2015); 
 
Second, the paper challenges the conventional wisdom that bottom-up policies are intrinsically 
better equipped to promote regional development by tailoring the programmes to local conditions 
and maximising local involvement (Pike et al, 2010). A growing body of empirical evidence suggests 
that regional policies often fail to deliver in the most disadvantaged areas (e.g. Kline and Moretti, 
2014; Neumark and Simpson, 2014) due to their more limited planning (and lobbying) capabilities. 
This paper innovatively tests the hypothesis that top-down policies (e.g., the EU CAP) by virtue of 
their more automatic spending mechanisms and simplified procedures may – in some cases – be 
more effective than bottom-up policies in order to channel resources to the most socio-economically 
deprived areas, benefitting territorial development.   
 
The empirical results – robust to a large number of checks - show that the EU Regional Policy has a 
positive and significant influence on economic growth in all regions that, however, is stronger in the 
most socio-economically advanced regions and maximised when Regional Policy expenditure is 
complemented by RDP and CAP funds, in line with the expectations of the EU2020 strategy. The top-
down funding of the CAP seems to be able to concentrate some benefits in the most deprived areas.  
Conversely only the most dynamic rural areas are capable of leveraging the bottom-up measures of 
the EU RDP. This suggests that EU policy makers in all fields should constantly look for the best mix 
of bottom-up and top-down measures in order to tackle structural disadvantage. 
 
2. Existing evidence and gaps  
The existing literature has identified a variety of regional characteristics as ‘conditioning factors’ for 
the impacts of the EU Cohesion policy. Institutional (Bahr, 2008; Cappelen et al., 2003; Ederveen et 
al., 2002 and 2006) and structural (Bouayad-agha, Turpin and Védrine, 2010; de Freitas, Pereira and 
Torres, 2003; Eggert et al., 2008; Giua, 2016; Martin and Tyler, 2006; Mohl and Hagen, 2008; Ramajo 
et al., 2008; Soukiazis and Antunes, 2006) elements have received a special attention in this stream 
of research. Other contributions have also looked into the nature and composition of the various 
policy measures promoted and funded by the EU Cohesion policy, highlighting a strong 
heterogeneity in the returns to different areas of expenditure and the limited impact of unbalanced 
strategies narrowly focused on infrastructure (Dall'erba, Guillain and Le Gallo, 2007; Rodríguez-Pose 
and Fratesi, 2004).  Conversely, very limited attention has been paid to the role of other EU policies 
that co-exist and interact with the EU regional policy on the ground. From a conceptual standpoint 
this may hide relevant processes in the understanding of regional growth dynamics and policies 
(Duhr et al., 2010; OECD, 2009b). Overlooking (some of) the elements that influence the relationship 
between the EU Regional Policy and regional economic performance (such as other EU Policies 
simultaneously affecting the regions under analysis), entails omitted variable and reverse causality 
biases (Mohl and Hagen, 2010)1 in part possibly explaining the conflicting conclusions reached by the 
existing studies (Crescenzi and Giua, 2016). 
 
During their historical evolution, the EU Cohesion Policy, RDP and the CAP have influenced each 
other. Together they represent roughly 80% of the total 2014-20 EU budget and the EU Regional 
Policy alone accounts for approximately 3% of the Gross National Income (GNI) of the less advanced 
Member States (European Commission, 2014). For a long time, CAP market measures were the most 
important EU policies. Instead, Cohesion Policy and RDP were underfunded and marginally 
developed (Crescenzi et al., 2015; Saraceno, 2002). With the Reform of the Structural Funds (1989) 
and Agenda 2000, the CAP and the EU Cohesion Policy became closely interdependent. In the 2000-
2006 policy programming period, regional and rural development policies were part of the same 
joint programmatic framework and their different measures were implemented by the same 
Institutions (Mairate, 2006; Manzella et al., 2009). In the 2007-2013 EU budget period they were 
again separated from one another in terms of programming and managing authorities. However, 
both EU institutions and researchers continue to stress – in principle - their joint contribution 
towards territorial cohesion (Barca, 2009; Crescenzi et al. 2015). 
Given their ‘spatially targeted’ nature, the strongest relation is that between regional and rural 
development policies.  However, it is increasingly recognized that CAP market measures have also 
spatial implications notwithstanding the purely top-down and ‘spatially blind’ nature of the policy. In 
line with the sectoral aim of agriculture support, CAP market measures2 are ‘captured’ by dynamic, 
more specialized and efficient producers (Duhr et al., 2010) with potentially perverse impact in 
terms of ‘distributive equity’ favouring the polarization of agricultural income and preventing less 
developed areas (where ‘weaker’ producers are disproportionally concentrated) from benefiting 
from its support (ESPON, 2004).  
In the absence of proper coordination between different policies the literature has highlighted the 
risk of a counter-treatment effect on overall economic growth, whereby one policy area may 
counterbalance the pro-cohesion effects of the other (Bivand e Brundstad, 2003; Bureau and Mahè, 
2008; Barca, 2009; European Commission, 2010; Duhr et al., 2010). Conversely, other research 
suggests that the CAP does not counteract the impact of the EU Regional Policy (Esposti, 2007) and 
                                                          
1
 Mohl and Hagen (2010) reviewed at least 15 other quantitative studies, which with similar approaches to 
those discussed above, reached altogether conflicting conclusions on the impact of the EU Cohesion Policies. 
2
 These potential distortions - linked to price support mechanisms - survived several reforms of the CAP, due to 
the reliance of many Member States on ‘historical models’ (since 2005) for the calculation of the ‘new’ de-
coupled direct payments. Only following the 2013 CAP reform, ‘flat rate’ payments have been finally 
introduced together with convergence mechanisms that should lead to more homogenous payments across 
beneficiaries, regions and countries (Crescenzi and De Filippis, forthcoming). 
once regional characteristics are appropriately controlled for, its contribution to cohesion might be 
greater than ‘Objective 1’ funds (Montresor et al., 2011).  In addition, RDP can also contribute to 
economic development in the most disadvantaged areas (Shucksmith et al., 2005).  
 
This review highlights two fundamental gaps in the existing literature. On the one hand limited 
attention has been devoted to the coexistence of a variety of EU policies in the same territorial unit, 
omitting a key set of territorial variables in the identification of policy impacts. On the other hand, 
the interaction (and the balance) between top-down and bottom-up approaches has been rarely 
studied, failing to learn relevant lessons for their coordination and optimal mix.  
 
3. A policy-augmented model of Regional Growth  
In order to analyse in a systematic and integrated fashion the interactions and regional impacts of 
‘spatially targeted’ and ‘space blind’ (as well as ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’) policies it is necessary 
to extend ‘standard’ regional growth models in order to account for: a) a broad set of policies that 
operate in the same territory; b) the territorial characteristics that shape (or condition) the impacts 
and the interactions of these policies. Following this line of reasoning the standard regional growth 
model (Cappelen et al. 2003; Camagni and Capello, 2010 & 2013; Capello and Lenzi, 2013; Crescenzi 
and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011 and 2012; Paci and Marrocu, 2013; Petrakos et al. 2005a and b, 2011) is 
augmented by: a  ‘policy matrix’  that includes expenditure under the EU Regional Policy, the RDP 
and the CAP; a ‘Territorial conditioning factors matrix’ that includes proxies for regional structural 
conditions;  and a ‘Policy interactions matrix’ that includes the interaction terms between the 
different policies and between the policies and regional contextual conditions.3  
 
The model is specified as follows: 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 𝑌𝑖0 + 𝜷1 𝑿𝟏𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷2 𝑿𝟐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷3 𝑿𝟑𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷4 𝑾𝑿𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜷5 𝑪𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
 
Where ɛ is idiosyncratic error, i represents the unit of analysis, t the policy programming period 
(1994-1999; 2000-2006; 2007-2013/09) and where4: 
ΔY is the regional GDP growth rate per capita (expressed in PPP - Purchase Power Parity) over the 
period from t-1 to t; 
Y is the natural logarithm of the level of regional GDP per capita at the beginning of each period; 
X1 is the ‘EU policy matrix’ : expenditure in each region for the EU budget programming periods 
1994-99; 2000-06 and 2007-13 for Regional Policy, RDP (‘spatially targeted’ policies) and CAP 
(‘spatially blind’ policy with territorial implications); 
X2 is the ‘Territorial conditioning factors matrix’: it includes regional structural socio-economic 
conditions in terms of demographics, productive structure and the labour market as well as regional 
                                                          
3
 For the sake of clarity, Beta coefficients reported in model (1) stand for vectors of coefficients. The model will 
estimate a separate coefficient for each variable included in each matrix. 
4
 Complete details on the variables included in the model are reported in Appendix B available on line 
innovative capacity and infrastructural endowment. In particular, the Social Filter Index (Rodríguez-
Pose 1999, Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose 2009 and 2011) combines a set of proxies for territorial 
structural preconditions conducive to favourable environments for the genesis of innovation and its 
translation into economic growth; the share of R&D in Regional GDP captures regional innovation 
efforts (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2011) and the level of regional infrastructural endowment 
(regional kilometers of motorways standardized by ‘total regional surface’5) is a proxy for the 
existing physical capital endowment.   
 
X3 is the ‘Policy interactions matrix’: it includes interaction terms between the individual 
components of the ‘policies matrix’ – in order to capture synergies or trade-offs between different 
EU policies – and interactions between the ‘policies matrix’ (X1) and the ‘territorial factors’ matrix 
(X2) in order to identify factors conditioning policy impacts. 
 
WX is the ‘spatially-lagged variables matrix’: it includes spatially lagged values computed with the k-
nearest neighbours criterion for: a) social filter index (favourable socio-economic conditions in 
neighbouring regions influence indigenous economic performance through imitative effects and the 
mobility/movement of human capital/skills facilitated by geographical proximity); b) R&D activities 
(Accessibility to extra-regional innovative activities can also influence internal economic 
performance through localised knowledge spillovers); c) infrastructural endowment (the 
infrastructural endowment of neighbouring regions proxies adequate inter-regional accessibility and 
the lack of infrastructural bottlenecks).  
 
C is a matrix of standard control variables, including the national annual growth rate; the Krugman 
index of specialization and population density.  
  
3.1 Units of analysis and data sources  
In order to maximise the homogeneity of the territorial units in terms of the degree of autonomy 
and administrative roles as also to capture the relevant target area in which the policies under 
analysis are implemented, the empirical analysis relies on a combination of NUTS-1 (for Belgium, 
Germany and the United Kingdom) and NUTS-2 (Austria, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) regions6. Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg are excluded 
from the analysis because they do not have relevant or equivalent sub-national divisions for the  
entire period under analysis. In addition, lack of data prevents the French Départments d’Outre-Mer 
(FR9) and of Trentino-Alto Adige from being included, while, given the introduction of spatially-
                                                          
5
 The proposed standardisation corrects for any potential bias linked to differences in surface of the EU 
regions. Even if this proxy is customary in the existing literature, it remains uninformative on the quality of 
infrastructure and does not reflect actual differences in construction and maintenance costs. 
6
 This combination of Eurostat NUTS regions corresponds to the TL2 classification developed by the OECD. 
lagged variables, remote islands or enclaves could not be included. Therefore, the final database 
comprises 139 territorial units belonging to 12 European EU-15 countries.7  
 
Structural Fund (ERDF and ESF) data (per capita ‘commitments’ for each policy programming period) 
have been provided for by the Directorate General for Regional Policy of the European Commission 
(DG REGIO) in May 2009.  Data referring on RDP are based on per capita ‘commitments’ for each 
policy programming period.  The first-pillar CAP data are instead, based on actual expenditure based 
on CAP total subsidies on crops and on livestock and CAP decoupled payments included in the Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN). The details of the computation of the regionalised expenditure 
data for RDP and CAP are discussed in Crescenzi et al. 2015.8  
 
Data for all territorial variables (dependent and independent) come from Eurostat.9 The values 
assigned to each of the three periods are computed as the average of their annual values over the 
policy programming period itself. With respect to the latest programming periods (2007-2013) all 
the territorial data are computed as an average of their annual values from 2007 to 2009, as 2009 is 
the last year for which data are available.  
 
The choice of aggregating all expenditure/commitment data by programming period is customary in 
the literature due to the lack of reliability of annual expenditure data that reflects the complexity of 
EU budgetary and reporting rules: expenditure reported in a specific year might not necessarily be 
spent in that year. In addition, this choice allows us to minimize reverse causality (Mohl and Hagen, 
2010) much more effectively than with annual data. Whole-period commitments are in fact assigned 
at the beginning of a multiannual period and, consequently, they do not depend on any subsequent 
shock (e.g., economic macro trend) that could occur over the period under analysis, thus leading to 
adjustments in annual expenditure (European Commission, 2015). The same multiannual 
specification is also generally preferred for the “regional growth rate”, which instead of being 
computed as the ratio between the level of GDP per capita in two consecutive years, is usually 
considered as the ratio between average GDP per capita levels over a period of at least 5-years 
(OECD, 2009a). The analysis conforms strictly to the literature and in this sense adopts the most 
common specification for the model: regional growth rate between time t and time t-1 is regressed 
on the policy at time t-1, where t stands for the policy programming periods. 
 
                                                          
7 
Due to lack of data on R&D Activities and on the variables composing the Social Filter Index finally, the 
effective number of observations in the analysis turned out to be 121. 
8
 Since data on the first pillar of the CAP are based on effective expenditure, they are available only until 2009. 
Therefore, for the 2007-2013 programming period we have a partial coverage. This is not an issue in terms of 
the quantitative analysis because the policy variables enter the model only with one period of lag i.e. the 
policy data related to the 2007-2013 period never enter the model. 
9 
Data on GDP Growth Rate for the Austrian and the Italian regions and data on Population density for the 
Spanish regions come from national sources because they are not available on the Eurostat System
. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The model specified in Equation 1 is estimated by means of Fixed Effect panel data (FE). In 
estimating the model, Fixed Effects-FE were found to be preferable to both Random Effects-RE and 
Correlated Random Effects-CRE specifications10 (Wooldridge, 2002). Standard tests were carried out 
on the estimated FE model. The model controls for heteroschedasticity and the spatial 
autocorrelation of the residuals. Time dummy variables capture programming period Fixed Effects, 
i.e. the evolution of the policies over time, and ‘clean’ the estimated coefficients from the influence 
of factors specific to individual programming periods. The inclusion of the spatially lagged variables 
allows us to remove spatial autocorrelation with no impact on the significance of the key variables of 
interests. In the robustness checks section the key specification of the model is re-estimated by 
means of spatial panel data models, confirming the results reported in the main tables and allowing 
us to exclude any bias due to spatial autocorrelation.11 
 
This is an exploratory analysis aimed at uncovering territorial dynamics linked with the EU Policies 
rather than identifying causal relationships – consequently, in what follows, we focus mainly on the 
sign and significance of coefficients, rather than the size of specific point estimates. 
 
Table 1 shows the magnitude and distribution of the policies’ commitments over time: the most 
significant part of total EU funding is represented by the CAP and Regional Policy. RDP’s role in terms 
of the amount of resources is still relatively small (Table 1).  
 
Table 1 - Policy Commitments (in Euro values, per capita) and Regional Growth (average rate). Financial Periods 1994-
1999; 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.  
  Mean Std. dev 
CAP 1994-99 813.47 631.47 
 2000-06 1118.44 847.91 
 2007-13 1042.24 834.57 
Regional Policy 1994-99 413.61 481.23 
 2000-06 652.84 707.95 
 2007-13 531.17 540.32 
Rural Development Policy 1994-99 78.82 95.52 
 2000-06 202.25 213.91 
 2007-13 206.26 181.36 
Regional GDP per capita average growth rate 1994-99 0.0198 0.0017 
 2000-06 0.0255 0.0010 
 2007-13 -0.0124 0.0026 
Source: authors’ elaboration using European Commission Data 
 
Moreover, both the CAP and the EU Regional Policy increased their resources from the first to the 
second programming period but underwent a reduction in the latest period (2007-2013) as a 
                                                          
10 
FE results were compared to RE’s by applying the Hausman Tests (Hausman and Tylor, 1981). In addition, 
when comparing FE estimations to the ‘Modified Random Effect’ estimator for CRE it was concluded that the 
FE estimator captures all exogenous variability available in the model and that FE was not only a consistent but 
also an efficient estimator for the regression coefficients. These additional results are available upon request. 
11
 In the main tables we report the standard panel data models in order to maximise comparability with other 
existing research and facilitate interpretation of the key coefficients. 
consequence of the extension of the policies to the New Member States of the EU (EU Commission, 
2008). Funds for RDP increased over the whole period studied (1994-1999; 2000-2006 and 2007-
2013).  
In contrast to the positive trend registered in the first two policy programming periods, the growth 
rate during the period 2007-2013 turned negative, reflecting the regional impacts of the 2008 
financial and economic crisis.  
 
Table 2 offers the key initial diagnostics for regional growth dynamics and EU expenditure. Total EU 
funding is positively and significantly correlated with regional economic growth. There is no evidence 
of a composition effect neutralising the overall impact of total EU funding: when considering total 
committed expenditure for the EU Regional Policy (ERFD and ESF), the RDP and the CAP together, 
the link with regional economic growth is positive and significant.  
When looking at the role of other key drivers of regional economic performance, table 2 shows that 
the coefficient of initial conditions (level of GDP at the beginning of the period) is negative and highly 
significant, confirming the process of conditional convergence detected in the existing literature 
(Bouayad-agha, Turpin and Védrine, 2010; Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008; Mohl and Hagen, 2008; 
Ramajo et al., 2008). The social filter – the broader set of socio-economic conditions – has also a 
positive but only marginally significant correlation with economic growth. The key controls behave 
as expected. National growth exerts a positive and significant influence on regional growth, 
confirming the importance of national framework conditions for regional performance 
(Monastiriotis, 2014).  The Krugman Index – negative and highly significant - confirms that 
diversification is a key strength for EU regions. When spatially lagged variables are introduced into 
the regression (column 2) the high significance of Total EU funding is confirmed and inter-regional 
knowledge spillovers emerge as a key driver for regional growth in line with previous literature 
(Moreno et al. 2005a and b; Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi 2008). 
 
Table 2 -  EU Regional Growth and overall EU Spending (All Policies). 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate  
 1 2 
Total EU Funding 
0.0570*** 
(0.0122) 
0.0520*** 
(0.0125) 
Ln of initial GDP p.c. 
-0.8016*** 
(0.0676) 
-0.7570*** 
(0.0670) 
Social Filter Index  
0.0190*  
(0.0102) 
-0.0002  
(0.0176) 
R&D Activities 
0.0055  
(0.0208) 
0.0070  
(0.0195) 
Infrastructural endowment 
1.5220  
(1.1194) 
0.8422 
(0.9630) 
Spatially Lagged Social Filter   
0.0249 
(0.0168) 
Spatially lagged R&D Activities  
0.0330** 
(0.0167) 
Spatially lagged Infrastructure  
2.1387 
(1.4234) 
National Growth Rate 
0.1270*** 
(0.0141) 
0.1352*** 
(0.0147) 
Krugman Index 
-0.0670** 
(0.0286) 
-0.0771** 
(0.0304) 
Population Density 
0.0001  
(0.0000) 
0.0001*  
(0.0000) 
Constant 
7.7730***  
(0.6841) 
7.2372*** 
(0.6717) 
Obs 
R squared  
Prob>F 
242 
0.902 
0.000 
 
242 
0.908 
0.000 
 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3 opens the ‘black box’ of total EU funding. The first specification (column 1) relates the 
dependent variable to the initial level of GDP, the policy variables, the territorial conditioning 
factors, the spatially lagged terms and the control variables (coefficients not reported in the table as 
in line with table 2). Columns 2, 3 and 4 show the results obtained by considering the interactions 
between EU Policies and territorial conditioning factors: column 2 shows the interaction between 
each EU policy and the social filter index; column 3 shows the policy interaction with R&D Activities; 
column 4 shows the policy interaction with regional infrastructural endowment. Finally, column 5 
shows the results obtained by considering the interactions within the ‘EU policy matrix’ (i.e. the 
interactions between the regional, RDP and CAP policies). 
 
Column 1 shows that the positive influence of total European funding should be attributed to the 
positive and significant role played by the EU Regional Policy, while the coefficients of both RDP and 
CAP are not significant. The EU Regional Policy is the only EU budget heading delivering a positive 
influence on regional growth. The ‘spatially targeted’ approach of the EU Regional Policy has been 
successful in supporting regional growth. Conversely, the CAP – notwithstanding the relevance of 
the financial resources distributed in each region – has not produced any relevant influence on 
average regional growth (Esposti, 2007). Furthermore, the results for rural development are not 
more encouraging: even if rural development policies should, in principle, combine an emphasis on 
rural areas with a bottom-up approach, they seem unable to do better than ‘traditional’ CAP 
interventions in terms of territorial cohesion.  
 
  
Table 3. – Regional Growth and the EU Regional Policy, Rural Development Policy and CAP. 
Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ‘territorial conditioning factors’ (Social Filter Index, R&D Activities, Infrastructural endowment 
Spatially Lagged Social Filter, Spatially lagged R&D Activities, Spatially lagged infrastructure) and the same control variables (Constant; National Growth Rate; Krugman Index and 
Population Density) reported in Table 1 are included in all regressions but not reported in the table.  
 
The analysis of the interaction terms makes it possible: i) to explore how the role of regional policy 
depends on the overall structure of the EU policies and on territorial conditioning factors; ii) to 
capture potential synergies or conflicts between Regional and other EU policies of different nature 
and iii) to understand how these interactions can change depending on their territorial context. 
 
Dependent variable: GDP per capita Average Growth Rate 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Ln of initial GDP p.c. 
-0.732*** 
(0.0786) 
-0.806*** 
(0.0760) 
-0.732*** 
(0.0778) 
-0.671*** 
(0.0847) 
-0.735***  
(0.0778) 
Regional Policy 
0.1028*** 
(0.0301) 
0.1365*** 
(0.0359) 
0.1095*** 
(0.0354) 
0.1184*** 
(0.0354) 
-0.0569 
(0.0551) 
Rural Development Policy 
0.0026  
(0.0236) 
0.0172  
(0.0273) 
-0.0649 
(0.0358) 
-0.0400  
(0.0282) 
0.1116 
(0.0734) 
CAP 
0.0308  
(0.0235) 
0.0245  
(0.0305) 
0.0804 
(0.0348) 
0.0458* 
(0.0254) 
-0.0060 
(0.0385) 
Social Filter Index*Regional Policy  
0.0414** 
(0.0205) 
  
 
Social Filter Index*Rural Development 
Policy 
 
0.0067 
(0.0397) 
  
 
Social Filter Index*CAP  
-0.0129  
(0.0120) 
  
 
R&D Activities*Regional Policy   
-0.0014 
(0.0353) 
 
 
R&D Activities*Rural Development Policy   
0.0264*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
R&D Activities*CAP   
-0.0410** 
(0.0178) 
 
 
Infrastructure*Regional Policy   
 -2.0114 
(1.5513) 
 
Infrastructure*Rural Development Policy   
 3.8648** 
(1.4986) 
 
Infrastructure*CAP   
 -2.8016** 
(1.1935) 
 
Regional Policy* Rural Development Policy   
 
 
0.1452** 
(0.0638) 
Regional Policy*CAP   
 
 
0.0422** 
(0.0185) 
Rural Development Policy*CAP   
 
 
-0.1056*** 
(0.0376) 
 ‘Territorial Conditioning Factors’,  ‘Spatially 
Lagged terms’ , Controls and constant 
X X X X X 
Period Dummies X X X X X 
Obs  
R squared  
Prob>F 
242 
0.913 
0.000 
242 
0.921 
0.000 
242 
0.916 
0.000 
242 
0.917 
0.000 
242 
0.922 
0.000 
The links between expenditure for the various policies and socio-economic contextual conditions are 
depicted by the interaction terms between the individual EU policy variables and the social filter 
index. The corresponding results are reported in column 2. Similarly to what Cappellen et. al (2003) 
suggested in a different framework, socio-economic conditions turn out to be a positive conditioning 
factor for regional policy impacts. The relationship between Regional Policy funding and regional 
growth is stronger for areas with more favourable socio-economic conditions: both the coefficients 
of the EU Regional Policy and that for the term of interaction ‘regional policy*social filter index’ are 
positive and significant. This makes it possible to reinforce and generalise existing evidence so far 
restricted to the impacts of EU investment in infrastructure (Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). 
Overall, regional policy generally supports growth but with stronger benefits for areas with 
favourable socio-economic conditions. It also emerges that the impact of Rural Development Policies 
and CAP is totally independent of socio-economic contextual conditions: their impact is not 
significant generally and nor is it conditioned by the socio-economic conditions of the regions.  
 
The interactions between EU policies and regional R&D activities and infrastructural endowments 
are presented in columns 3 and 4 respectively. The coefficients suggest that both R&D activities and 
infrastructure matter when RDP and CAP funds are considered. In particular, RDP funds might 
influence economic growth when targeted at regions with a comparatively stronger innovative and 
infrastructural environment (i.e. the most dynamic rural areas in Europe). Conversely, CAP funds – 
with their spatially blind approach, uninfluenced in the allocation and absorption of the funds by the 
a priori socio-institutional quality of the region– work better in the most disadvantaged areas, 
characterised by limited infrastructural and innovation endowments. This section of the analysis, 
therefore, confirms that ‘spatially blind’ policies do have spatial implications (Montresor et al., 
2011). CAP funding is not influenced by the heterogeneous capabilities of the regions to ‘bargain’ for 
resources - these are allocated in a top-down fashion by means of subsidies largely linked to 
‘historical’ production data– or by their administrative capacity to absorb allocated funds. As a result 
CAP resources are able to exert a positive influence on economic growth in the most deprived and 
structurally disadvantaged regions of the Union.  
 
The results in column 5 of Table 3 provide new evidence on the links within the ‘EU policy matrix’: 
the model specification now includes the terms of interaction between Regional Policy and the other 
EU policies. The EU Regional Policy’s role is positively conditioned by synergies with all other 
policies: all interaction terms are positive and capture the marginal benefit from the policies on 
cohesion determined by such synergies. Instead, the interaction between the two ‘agricultural’ 
policies (CAP and RDP) shows a negative sign. When both CAP and RDP are targeted at regions that 
also benefit from more generous EU Regional Policy resources, the positive influence on regional 
growth is - ceteris paribus – maximised. But the same is not true for the interaction between RDP 
and CAP: when both ‘agricultural’ policies channel a high level of funding to the same region they 
tend to generate sectoral distortions detrimental to long-term economic growth. Consequently, the 
results suggest that the synergistic use of different sources of funding and tools of a diversified 
nature can boost economic growth,  while ‘specialisation’ in one single policy area is likely to 
generate decreasing returns and reinforce inconsistencies.  
 
4.1 EU policies in regions of varying economic performance: Quantile Regression analysis 
 
The use of interaction terms made it possible to study how the impact of the policies varies 
according to the characteristics of the regions in which they are implemented. However, the 
inclusion of the initial GDP per capita among the interacted terms is technically problematic due to 
endogeneity and simultaneity since initial regional GDP is also the key eligibility criterion for Regional 
Policy Expenditure. Therefore, we rely on Quantile Regression (QR) techniques in order to measure 
the effect of the policy not only at the centre but also for different quantiles of the distribution 
(Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004). By estimating QR models we can 
investigate how the link between the EU Regional Policy and regional growth changes with the 
distribution of regional growth. This additional analysis captures if and to what extent areas with 
different regional growth rate (three distribution’s quantiles: 0.10, 0.5 and 0.75) benefit from the EU 
Regional Policy. Unfortunately, contrary to the effects of other covariates, it is technically impossible 
to allow individual Fixed Effects to vary across quantiles given that the quantile of the difference can 
be not equal to the difference in quantiles (Ponomareva, 2011). As a consequence, QR cannot be 
applied in the Fixed Effect panel data framework (Kato et al., 2012) adopted in the rest of this paper. 
However, in line with the current state-of-the-art of the econometrics literature, we can still apply 
QR in a cross sectional framework (Buchinsky, 1994; Powell, 2011; Powell and Wagner, 2011) in 
order to shed some new light on the impacts of the policy in regions with different economic 
performance. The corresponding results are presented as ancillary evidence and reported in Table 
A.3 in Appendix A12. Fixed Effect panel data estimates – that allow us to deal with omitted variable 
bias as extensively discussed above – remain our main results. 
 
The coefficients of the key variables confirm that the link between EU Regional Policy spending and 
economic growth is stronger in relatively richer and faster-growing areas. This finding suggests that 
although the policy’s role is generally positive, it is not working completely in line with its main aim, 
namely to remedy the gaps between the disadvantaged and the relatively more dynamic areas of 
the Union (Crescenzi, 2009). The strength of the relationship between the EU Regional Policy and 
growth is maximised in the already best performing EU regions. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
The robustness of the results is tested in a number of ways and the corresponding additional tables 
are included in Appendix A available on line. 
 
5.1 Measurement error and endogeneity bias 
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 More methodological details for these additional sections of the empirical analysis are reported in Appendix 
A together with the key results. 
In order to test for measurement error problems the analysis was reproduced with the use of an 
alternative measure for the key independent variable of interest. The policy variable adopted in the 
main analysis (whole period Commitments) is replaced by annual payments.  Whole-period 
Commitments are considered in the literature more reliable policy indicators than annual Payments 
(OECD, 2009a; Mohl and Hagen, 2010).  Whole-period averages are more accurate than annual data 
given that annual payments largely reflect reporting and accounting rules rather than actual 
expenditure patterns. In addition, whole-period commitments are more exogenous with respect to 
external shocks that can simultaneously influence both economic growth and expenditure. The key 
regressions have been replicated with a specification, sample and time period that enable us to 
make comparisons as between the results of the estimation of equation 1 obtained by using 
Commitments (as in previous tables) and actual payments. Further details on these additional 
estimations are reported in Appendix A. The additional regressions confirm that the impact of the EU 
Regional Policy on regional economic growth is positive and significant when payments are used as 
an alternative policy measure, provided that their endogeneity is appropriately accounted for in an 
IV framework. 
In order to address any potential endogeneity issues, and identify the parameter of interest more 
accurately, we explicitly allow actual payments to be an endogenous variable and use commitments 
(decided a priori and well before actual economic growth is observable) as the corresponding 
instrument in an Instrumental Variable analysis. The choice of the instrument is confirmed by the 
first stage regression, and justified by the fact that Commitments, strongly correlated with 
Payments, only influence the economic performance of regions when transformed into expenditure 
(through the payments channel). Consequently, they represent an exogenous and relevant 
instrument to permit the model to correct the endogeneity bias likely to affect Payments. 
The Hausman test confirms our intuition as concerns the ‘endogeneity’ of Payments. The IV 
regression that instruments Payments with the Commitments is preferred to OLS, as the latter 
considers Payments exogenous. The results of the IV regression are set out in Table A.2 column 3 in 
the on-line Appendix A.  
 
Overall these tests confirm the choice of our key policy variable. Commitments are not only capable 
of acting as a proxy for the policy by delivering the same results that would have been produced by 
considering the effective expenditure, but also that the Payments by themselves are unlikely to 
account for policy in a coherent manner insofar as identified as endogenous by the Hausman test13 
for endogeneity. 
 
5.2 Misspecification of the dependent variable 
The specification of the model is in line with the standard panel data literature on regional economic 
growth and regional policy analysis (OECD, 2009a; Mohl and Hagen, 2010). In order to control for the 
robustness of the results with respect to the specification of the outcome variable, the model is re-
estimated with an alternative version of the GDP growth rate.  In particular, the main regression is 
                                                          
13 
The p value of the test is equal to 0.0041. 
re-estimated with a GDP growth rate computed as the natural logarithmic of average annual GDP 
growth rate over the first three years of each programming period t. This outcome variable is 
regressed on the independent variables taken at the time t-1 so that the GDP growth rate can be 
computed with respect to an initial period that is successive to the period to which the policy is 
related rather than coinciding with it. This eliminates any time overlap between the dependent and 
explanatory variable and reduce any simultaneity bias likely to affect the model: in this case, the 
idiosyncratic shocks occurred during the policy multiannual programming period (t-1) do not enter in 
the computation of the GDP growth rate determined within the following policy multiannual 
programming period (t). These robustness tests confirm the results of the main analysis (Tables A.3.a 
and A.3.b. in Appendix A):  even when the outcome variable is changed, the role of EU Regional 
Policy as well as that of overall European support remains positive and significant.  
 
5.3. Spatial dependence and spatial panel data analysis 
The main specification of the Regional Growth model presented in the paper includes the spatial lags 
of the key conditioning factors: after their inclusion there is no evidence of residual spatial auto-
correlation in the regression residuals. However, in order to further check the robustness of the 
proposed results, other forms of spatial autocorrelation are controlled for by means of alternative 
specifications of the model. The Spatial Autoregressive (SAR and DURBIN) specifications of model (1) 
account for the spatial dynamics of the dependent variable with spatially lagged Y (Spatial lag 
models) coefficient. The Spatial Error Model (SEM) will, instead, account for the dependence 
determining the spatially inter-correlation between the error terms. The technical details of these 
additional estimations are discussed in the on-line Appendix A and Results are reported Table A.4. 
These additional regressions confirm the key results of the analysis: spatial dependence related to Y 
is not statistically significant while signs and significance of the main coefficient of interest (Regional 
Policy) are all confirmed.  
 
         5. Conclusions 
Understanding if and under what (territorial) conditions different policies can contribute to regional 
economic growth is key not only to the future of the EU policies but – more generally – to all 
countries and regions where similar policy tools co-exist and interact (e.g. in the USA).  
The results presented in the paper show that EU Cohesion Policy expenditure is associated with 
stronger regional growth rates in all regions. This key result emerges clearly in all specifications of 
the model and is robust to a large number of tests. However, the positive influence of the EU 
Regional Policy is stronger in the regions with the most favourable socio-economic environment. 
This reveals a potential paradox of the EU Cohesion policy that works better in the relatively 
stronger (and better performing) regions with comparatively smaller (although still positive) gains 
for the most disadvantaged areas of the Union.  The RDP, that is attracting increasing resources from 
the progressive reduction in funding of the more traditional market-based agricultural policies of the 
CAP, is not systematically linked with regional economic growth. Some positive influence of RDP only 
emerges in the most advanced and better endowed areas: the rural areas of the ‘core’ of the EU not 
the most disadvantaged and peripheral. The ‘traditional’ agricultural market-related CAP funding has 
also no direct link with regional growth. However, there is no evidence of a counter-treatment effect 
working against cohesion. Conversely, where the influence of CAP on growth emerges it is in the 
most disadvantaged areas of the Union (those with a poor infrastructural endowment and less 
innovation). This result sends an important message on the possibility that traditional top-down 
policies (such as the CAP) might be capable to channel their funds towards the most deprived 
regions of the Union with some positive influence on economic growth. On the contrary the 
complexity of the programming of bottom-up interventions might lead to a concentration of the 
benefits in stronger areas. Finally, the analysis also shows that policy coordination is of paramount 
importance: returns from the EU Regional Policy are maximised where funding from other policies is 
also concentrated.  
 
Although robust to a large number of tests, some key limitations should be borne in mind when 
interpreting these results. First, regional economic growth is not the only outcome of interest for EU 
policies. All EU policies produce a number of other tangible and intangible outcomes (and public 
goods) that cannot be captured by the proposed analysis. Second the analysis is unable to unveil 
causal links: a number of techniques and checks have been adopted to minimise any potential bias 
due to endogeneity but we still this is not a fully causal analysis. Third, the time period covered by 
the analysis remains relatively limited and more data will be need for more long-term analysis. The 
now completely digitalised and harmonised collection of expenditure data will make this possible in 
the near future14. However, additional efforts will be needed (by Statistical Offices, the European 
Commission as well as individual researchers) in order to develop better EU-wide regional-level 
proxies for some key regional characteristics. Especially relevant in this regard are more accurate 
proxies for regional physical capital endowments with special reference to infrastructure (and their 
quality). 
Having acknowledged these limitations it is still possible to make some relevant policy 
considerations based on the results presented in the paper. The reinforcement of the local socio-
economic environment is a crucial pre-condition for the success of any regional policy. This is of 
fundamental importance in order to maximise the returns to regional policy expenditure in the most 
deprived areas. Addressing this potential paradox is even more relevant to Rural Development 
interventions whose pro-growth potential is totally conditioned upon the pre-existing conditions of 
the target areas.  
In order to address the structural conditions of the most disadvantaged regions purely bottom-up 
tools might be insufficient. Tailoring the various policies to local needs is certainly crucial. However, 
the analysis of the territorial effect of ‘traditional’ top-down agricultural CAP expenditure unveils a 
relevant story: top-down interventions might be very effective in order to channel resources to the 
                                                          
14
 Due to data limitations at the regional level we have been unable to include into the analysis EU expenditure 
under the Framework Programmes for Research and Technological Development to support and foster 
research in the European Research Area (ERA). The amount of resources absorbed by the Framework 
Programmes (55 billion euros in 2007-2013) is not comparable in magnitude to the funding for Regional, Rural 
Development and the Common Agricultural Policies considered in the analysis (roughly 90% of the total EU 
budget, i.e. approximately 900 billion euros in 2007-2013). However, the study of this complementary area of 
EU policy remains in our agenda for future research. 
most deprived areas. Where institutions are weak and local lobbies can form strong anti-growth 
coalitions the identification of local needs and the planning and implementation of bottom-up 
actions might be difficult. In these contexts, top-down policies might be more effective in 
earmarking resources to support basic investment in physical and human capital in the most 
deprived areas. As a consequence, a bottom-up approach to regional development policies is not 
necessarily the best possible solution for all regions. The experience of the EU suggests that it is 
necessary to carefully assess the best mix of bottom-up and top-down interventions to match the 
conditions of the various countries and regions. In the same vein a national-level coordination and 
agenda-setting might also favour the coordination among the various policies on the ground: at the 
local level conflicts and contrasts between the various agencies and offices might make this more 
difficult to achieve. The coordination between ‘spatially targeted’ and ‘space blind’ policies – that 
our analysis has shown to be key in order to maximise regional growth – might require the flexible 
integration of both bottom-up and top-down approaches. 
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